Bill Clinton on Kargil war [1999] in his autobiography ''My Life" , page 700 : [Research by SAHIL SHARIFDIN English]
Bill Clinton on Kargil war [1999] in his autobiography ''My Life" , page 700 :
[Research by SAHIL SHARIFDIN English]
[Research by SAHIL SHARIFDIN English]
''Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan called and asked if he could come to Washington on
July 4 to discuss the dangerous standoff with India that had begun several weeks earlier when
Pakistani forces under the command of General Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of
Control, which had been the recognized and generally observed boundary between India and
Pakistan in Kashmir since 1972. Sharif was concerned that the situation Pakistan had created
was getting out of control, and he hoped to use my good offices not only to resolve the crisis
but also to help mediate with the Indians on the question of Kashmir itself. Even before the
crisis, Sharif had asked me to help in Kashmir, saying it was as worthy of my attention as the
Middle East and Northern Ireland. I had explained to him then that the United States was
involved in those peace processes because both sides wanted us. In this case, India had
strongly refused the involvement of any outside party.
Sharif’s moves were perplexing because that February, Indian prime minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee had traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the
Kashmir problem and other differences. By crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had
wrecked the talks. I didn’t know whether Sharif had authorized the invasion to create a crisis
he hoped would get America involved or had simply allowed it in order to avoid a
confrontation with Pakistan’s powerful military. Regardless, he had gotten himself into a bind
with no easy way out.
I told Sharif that he was always welcome in Washington, even on July 4, but if he wanted me
to spend America’s Independence Day with him, he had to come to the United States knowing
two things: first, he had to agree to withdraw his troops back across the Line of Control; and second, I would not agree to intervene in the Kashmir dispute, especially under circumstances
that appeared to reward Pakistan’s wrongful incursion.
Sharif said he wanted to come anyway. On July 4, we met at Blair House. It was a hot day,
but the Pakistani delegation was used to the heat and, in their traditional white pants and long
tunics, seemed more comfortable than my team. Once more, Sharif urged me to intervene in
Kashmir, and again I explained that without India’s consent it would be counterproductive,
but that I would urge Vajpayee to resume the bilateral dialogue if the Pakistani troops
withdrew. He agreed, and we released a joint statement saying that steps would be taken to
restore the Line of Control and that I would support and encourage the resumption and
intensification of bilateral talks once the violence had stopped.
After the meeting, I thought perhaps Sharif had come in order to use pressure from the United
States to provide himself cover for ordering his military to defuse the conflict. I knew he was
on shaky ground at home, and I hoped he would survive, because I needed his cooperation in
the fight against terrorism.''
July 4 to discuss the dangerous standoff with India that had begun several weeks earlier when
Pakistani forces under the command of General Pervez Musharraf crossed the Line of
Control, which had been the recognized and generally observed boundary between India and
Pakistan in Kashmir since 1972. Sharif was concerned that the situation Pakistan had created
was getting out of control, and he hoped to use my good offices not only to resolve the crisis
but also to help mediate with the Indians on the question of Kashmir itself. Even before the
crisis, Sharif had asked me to help in Kashmir, saying it was as worthy of my attention as the
Middle East and Northern Ireland. I had explained to him then that the United States was
involved in those peace processes because both sides wanted us. In this case, India had
strongly refused the involvement of any outside party.
Sharif’s moves were perplexing because that February, Indian prime minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee had traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the
Kashmir problem and other differences. By crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had
wrecked the talks. I didn’t know whether Sharif had authorized the invasion to create a crisis
he hoped would get America involved or had simply allowed it in order to avoid a
confrontation with Pakistan’s powerful military. Regardless, he had gotten himself into a bind
with no easy way out.
I told Sharif that he was always welcome in Washington, even on July 4, but if he wanted me
to spend America’s Independence Day with him, he had to come to the United States knowing
two things: first, he had to agree to withdraw his troops back across the Line of Control; and second, I would not agree to intervene in the Kashmir dispute, especially under circumstances
that appeared to reward Pakistan’s wrongful incursion.
Sharif said he wanted to come anyway. On July 4, we met at Blair House. It was a hot day,
but the Pakistani delegation was used to the heat and, in their traditional white pants and long
tunics, seemed more comfortable than my team. Once more, Sharif urged me to intervene in
Kashmir, and again I explained that without India’s consent it would be counterproductive,
but that I would urge Vajpayee to resume the bilateral dialogue if the Pakistani troops
withdrew. He agreed, and we released a joint statement saying that steps would be taken to
restore the Line of Control and that I would support and encourage the resumption and
intensification of bilateral talks once the violence had stopped.
After the meeting, I thought perhaps Sharif had come in order to use pressure from the United
States to provide himself cover for ordering his military to defuse the conflict. I knew he was
on shaky ground at home, and I hoped he would survive, because I needed his cooperation in
the fight against terrorism.''
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